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According to the “embodied cognition” theory and the “sensory-motor model of semantic
knowledge”: (a) concepts are represented in the brain in the same format in which they
are constructed by the sensory-motor system and (b) various conceptual categories differ
according to the weight of different kinds of information in their representation. In this
study, we tried to check the second assumption by asking normal elderly subjects to
subjectively evaluate the role of various perceptual, motor and language-mediated sources
of knowledge in the construction of different semantic categories. Our first aim was to
rate the influence of different sources of knowledge in the representation of animals,
plant life and artifact categories, rather than in living and non-living beings, as many
previous studies on this subject have done. We also tried to check the influence of age and
stimulus modality on these evaluations of the “sources of knowledge” underlying different
conceptual categories. The influence of age was checked by comparing results obtained
in our group of elderly subjects with those obtained in a previous study, conducted with
a similar methodology on a sample of young students. And the influence of stimulus
modality was assessed by presenting the stimuli in the verbal modality to 50 subjects
and in the pictorial modality to 50 other subjects. The distinction between “animals” and
“plant life” in the “living” categories was confirmed by analyzing their prevalent sources
of knowledge and by a cluster analysis, which allowed us to distinguish “plant life” items
from animals. Furthermore, results of the study showed: (a) that our subjects considered
the visual modality as the main source of knowledge for all categories taken into account;
and (b) that in biological categories the next most important source of information was
represented by other perceptual modalities, whereas in artifacts it was represented by
the actions performed with them. Finally, age and stimulus modality did not significantly
influence judgment of relevance of the sources of knowledge involved in the construction
of different conceptual categories.
Keywords: interactions among sources of knowledge, animals vs. plant-life vs. artifact categories, sensory-motor
model of semantic knowledge, visual-related knowledge, action-related conceptual knowledge
INTRODUCTION
Our knowledge of the world is mediated by two sorts of activities:
(1) perceptual activities, which allow us to obtain information
about external objects; (2) conceptual activities, which allow us
to have internal representations of categories of objects. Even if
both kinds of activities are necessary to understand the world we
live in, the relationship between them is controversial and the
amount of information that we have about their neuroanatom-
ical and functional organization is very different. For example,
we have detailed knowledge about the anatomical and functional
organization of visual, auditory and somato-sensory systems, but
the relationships between perceptual and conceptual activities are
more controversial and there are strong debates about the format,
the functional architecture and the neuroanatomical substrates of
concepts.
Two main models have been advanced on this subject.
According to the first model, proposed by Fodor (1975) and
Pylyshyn (1973) and developed by Caramazza et al. (1990) and
Patterson and Hodges (2000), concepts are represented in the
brain in a formal, abstract manner, totally unrelated to the
sensory-motor functions of the brain. According to this line of
thought, modality-specific perceptual systems process sensory
information up to a critical level (the structural description),
that permits access to a unitary, abstract and amodal semantic
system, where no trace of the previous sensory-motor mecha-
nisms persists. On the contrary, according to the second model,
proposed by Allport (1985) and Jackendoff (1987) and devel-
oped by Damasio (1989, 1990), Gainotti (1990, 2006), Saffran
and Schwartz (1994), Gainotti et al. (1995), Martin (1998, 2007),
Pulvermuller (1999), Martin and Chao (2001), Barsalou (2008),
Kalénine et al. (2010), and Kiefer and Pulvermüller (2012) con-
cepts are represented in the same format in which they were
constructed by the sensory-motor system and can be considered
as activity patterns distributed across different perceptual and
motor attribute domains and integrated with language-mediated
encyclopedic information.
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In agreement with this second line of thought, anatomo-
clinical studies of category-specific semantic disorders, which
were prompted by a series of seminal papers by Warrington and
coworkers (Warrington, 1975, 1981; Warrington and McCarthy,
1983, 1987; Warrington and Shallice, 1984) have suggested: (a)
that different brain lesions may disrupt different categories of
knowledge and (b) that the brain’s organization of categori-
cal knowledge may reflect the importance of the sensory-motor
mechanisms which have mainly contributed to the development
of different categories (the “differential weighting hypothesis”).
In the original formulation of this general model, Warrington
and Shallice (1984) contrasted the impairment of living beings
with that of artifacts, and interpreted this dissociation as the con-
sequence of the major role played by visual features in the
identification of living things, and by functional features in the
identification of nonliving (artifacts) categories.
THE SENSORY-FUNCTIONAL THEORY AND THE EMBODIED
COGNITION/SENSORY-MOTOR MODEL OF SEMANTIC
REPRESENTATION
This interpretation, usually called the “sensory-functional the-
ory”/SFT (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Tyler et al., 2000;
Capitani et al., 2003; Ventura et al., 2005) has been unable
to explain the complexity of the clinical data, because “func-
tional features” are an heterogeneous class that includes actions
accomplished with objects, notions about the objects’ use and
verbally-mediated encyclopedic knowledge. This fact was stressed
by Buxbaum et al. (2000), Buxbaum and Saffran (2002), and
Boronat et al. (2005). Within functional knowledge, these authors
distinguished the function of an object from its manipulation and
suggested that “manipulation” (which is related to a sensorimotor
activity), might be the component most tightly linked to the “dif-
ferential weighting” hypothesis. The same authors also showed
that not only the properties denoted by the term “functional,” but
also those subsumed by the term “sensory” are heterogeneous,
because different types of sensory data could have a different
weight in different kinds of semantic categories. Thus, the visual
perception might play a leading role in the mental representation
of animals and the somatosensory data in that of tools. These
considerations led several authors (e.g., Saffran and Schwartz,
1994; Gainotti et al., 1995; Chao et al., 1999; Gainotti, 2000,
2006; Martin et al., 2000; Martin and Chao, 2001; Martin, 2007)
to replace the “sensory-functional theory” with the “embodied
cognition” theory (Barsalou, 2008) or with the “sensory-motor
model of semantic knowledge,” (Gainotti, 2000, 2006; Martin
and Chao, 2001; Martin, 2007), which takes into account var-
ious kinds of perceptual, functional, motor and verbally-coded
properties, that can contribute to the construction of a conceptual
representation.
STUDIES WHICH HAVE TRIED TO ASSESS THE WEIGHT OF VARIOUS
KINDS OF INFORMATION IN THE REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERENT
CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES
Several studies have tried to assess the weight of various kinds
of information in the representation of different conceptual cate-
gories, by asking normal subjects to make a subjective evaluation
of the role of various perceptual, motor and language-mediated
sources of knowledge in the construction of different semantic
categories. After early studies that used dictionary definitions to
obtain this information (Farah andMcClelland, 1991; Caramazza
and Shelton, 1998), two more recent sources of evidence have
been used to evaluate the insight of normal subjects into the
structure of concepts: (a) feature-listing tasks and (b) Likert-
like scales devised to evaluate the weight of different “sources of
knowledge” (Gainotti et al., 2009). In the feature-listing tasks,
subjects are provided with a set of words and asked to generate
features they associate with each word (Devlin et al., 1998; Tyler
et al., 2000; Garrard et al., 2001; McRae and Cree, 2002; Vinson
and Vigliocco, 2002; Cree and McRae, 2003; Vanoverberghe and
Storms, 2003; Vinson et al., 2003; Vigliocco et al., 2004; McRae
et al., 2005; Ventura et al., 2005; Zannino et al., 2006). In studies
using Likert like scales to evaluate the weight of different “sources
of knowledge,” verbal or pictorial stimuli which belong to differ-
ent semantic categories, are shown to normal subjects. Using a
graduated scale, the latter have to evaluate the relevance of differ-
ent perceptual (visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory, and gustative),
motor or language mediated information in the mental represen-
tation of the corresponding stimuli (Tranel et al., 1997; Gainotti
et al., 2009; Carota et al., 2012; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph,
2013).
When a fine-grained taxonomy that distinguishes between dif-
ferent sensory modalities was used and the “performed action”
(instead of the “function” category) was chosen, (e.g., Tranel et al.,
1997; Vigliocco et al., 2004; McRae et al., 2005; Gainotti et al.,
2009; Carota et al., 2012; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph, 2013)
some results were consistently found with both methodologies
used to evaluate the weight of different “sources of knowledge.”
Thus, when the scores assigned to each modality were compared,
visual information was consistently evaluated as the most impor-
tant source of knowledge across all conceptual categories (Tranel
et al., 1997; Cree and McRae, 2003; McRae et al., 2005; Gainotti
et al., 2009; Carota et al., 2012; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph,
2013) and similar categorical clusters were obtained on the basis
of the subjective ratings.
On the other hand, Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (2013) made
a direct comparison between the verbal feature-listing task and a
separate rating of each sensory-motor modality, and found that
the former gave a distorted picture, with a strong bias toward
visual form and function knowledge, whereas the latter uncov-
ered a richer multimodal store of information, leading to novel
insights about the structure of semantic space. The same authors
also maintained that different results could be obtained by sep-
arately evaluating various “sources of knowledge” if the stimuli
were presented as pictures or as written words.
AIMS OF THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION
We set out to more thoroughly evaluate whether the subjective
judgments of normal adults about the weight of different sources
of knowledge in the development of different conceptual cat-
egories are consistent with the assumptions of the Embodied
Cognition/sensory-motor model. To carry this out, we took into
account a number of variables that have not yet been considered,
or have given conflicting results. More specifically, we evaluated
two main and two secondary issues:
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1. The first main issue consisted of rating the influence of
different sources of knowledge in the representation of ani-
mals, plant life and artifact categories, rather than in those
of living and non-living beings, because many studies have
already investigated this topic. The distinction (within the
“living things”) between “animals” and “plant life” categories
is suggested by two main facts: (a) these two categories
can be dissociated by brain damage (see Caramazza and
Shelton, 1998; Gainotti, 2005, 2010, 2011; Laiacona et al.,
2006; Capitani et al., 2009 for reviews and discussions); (b)
when hierarchical cluster analyses were used in feature list-
ing studies (e.g., Cree and McRae, 2003) or in studies based
on a separate rating of each sensory-motor modality (e.g.,
Gainotti et al., 2009; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph, 2013), a
tripartite organization of knowledge was found, with three
major clusters distinguishing between animals, plant life, and
artifacts.
2. The second important aim of our study was to try to obtain
a better understanding of the contribution deriving to the
construction of various conceptual categories not from a
single dominant source of knowledge, but from the asso-
ciation between several important sources of information.
In a previous study (Gainotti et al., 2009) we showed that,
if the visual data were considered as the most important
source of knowledge for all categories considered, the next
most relevant fonts of information were different for the
living and the artifact categories. They consisted of other
perceptual data in the case of the biological entities and
of bodily-related actions and somato-sensory information in
the case of artifacts. This method, was recently validated by
Carota et al. (2012) in a two-stages fMRI study. In the first
(behavioral) study, the body parts primarily and secondar-
ily involved in actions accomplished with different categories
of objects were evaluated by normal subjects using a Likert
like scale. In the second (experimental) study the parts of
the motor cortices activated by presentation of the corre-
sponding words were investigated. This study showed that
the hierarchy of bodily actions identified in the behavioral
stage corresponded with the hierarchy of activation of the
corresponding parts of the motor cortex in the fMRI study.
Therefore, a more detailed study of these different patterns was
necessary.
3. The third (less important) issue concerned the influence of
the verbal or pictorial nature of the stimuli on the evalu-
ation of the role played by various perceptual, motor, and
language-mediated “sources of knowledge” in the construc-
tion of different conceptual categories.
4. The last (also less important) aim was to study these prob-
lems in a sample of elderly subjects who were unselected
with respect to their educational level and working activi-
ties, because all previous studies based on feature-listing and
the Likert-like scale methodology were conducted in young
undergraduate students. On one hand, as humans tend to
change their interests and their preferential approach to dif-
ferent aspects of experience during the lifespan, and as the
sensory/motor theory is focused on experience as the basis
of conceptual knowledge (Kellenbach et al., 2003; Noppeney
et al., 2006; Connolly et al., 2007), it could be predicted
that some differences would be found in the results obtained
in a group of older and less educated subjects and those
obtained by Gainotti et al. (2009) in a previous study car-
ried out using the same material with young undergraduate
students. For instance, due to the recent massive develop-
ment of the media (mainly based on visual data), it is possible
that the acquisition of knowledge about wild animals had
been rated as relying above all on verbal material in elderly
patients, but was based much more upon visual material in
young students. It is also possible that for some categories of
artifacts or fruits and vegetable (whose knowledge is partly
based upon manipulation and action schemata) the relevance
of action-related sources of knowledge, which are linked to
the utilization of these schemata, might increase with age.
The relationships among categories of knowledge might also
change as a function of personal experience. Thus, in elderly
subjects who, in their youth, might have used animals (e.g.,
horses or donkeys) as a means of transportation, the cate-
gories of animals and vehicles might be more closely linked
than in young students who have never had this kind of
experience.
On the other hand, if results similar to those obtained in young
undergraduate students were found also in older, less educated
subjects, this would contribute to confirming and expanding
the significance of results obtained in previous investigations on
this topic with respect to the sensory-motor model of semantic
knowledge.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
SUBJECTS AND MATERIALS
Material
Data were collected using two booklets that had a standardized
format. Both contained 49 sheets of paper, each of which had a
different item heading. Each items was represented in one book-
let with the picture of the target stimulus and in the other booklet
with the corresponding written word printed in big capital letters.
The items consisted of 12 animals (6 pets and 6 wild animals), 16
plant life items (6 flowers, 5 vegetables, and 5 fruits) and 21 arti-
facts (5 pieces of furniture, 5 vehicles, 5 articles of clothing, and
6 tools). These items were as those used in our previous investi-
gations (Gainotti et al., 2009). They were selected from a corpus
of 100 colored pictures, on the basis of results obtained in a pilot
study, conducted on an independent sample of 10 undergraduate
students. The latter were requested to indicate the most familiar
and prototypical items for each category and to judge each one for
its imageability, concreteness, familiarity, and age of acquisition.
Full agreement among the raters with respect to the high proto-
typicality of the stimuli was the main criterion used to select the
most appropriate members of each category A second criterion
was a good comparability between the different categories as for
values concerning Age of Acquisition, Concreteness, Familiarity,
and Imageability. No effort was made to have the same number
of stimuli in each category. Subjects were requested to evaluate
their familiarity with each stimulus object and the relevance of
a number of sensory-motor sources of knowledge [visual shape
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and color, auditory, tactile, olfactory and taste (gustatory) percep-
tions and motor activities and language-mediated encyclopedic
information] in constructing their knowledge of it. In a prelimi-
nary pilot study, we had also included within the visual sources of
knowledge the observed movement of objects, because this aspect
of vision, which is represented in the middle and superior tem-
poral gyri (Beauchamp et al., 2002) was considered separately in
studies conducted on undergraduate students by Cree andMcRae
(2003) and by Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (2013). This vari-
able has been, however, excluded from the final version of our
study because our elderly subjects, who were unselected with
respect to their educational level and working activities, tended
to confound the actions made on objects with their intrinsic
movements.
In the present study, subjects had to assign a score rang-
ing from 0 to 7 (0 denoted “no familiarity” and “no relevance”
and 7, “very high familiarity” and “very high relevance”) to
indicate the familiarity with each stimulus and to evaluate the
relevance of each “source of knowledge” in constructing its rep-
resentation. Five practice sheets, were given, which included
items drawn from five different categories, saying, for instance,
that “banana” is probably very familiar, because it is a com-
mon fruit, and that its knowledge could be mostly due to its
visual properties (typical shape and yellow color), taste, and the
actions made to peel it, whereas verbal descriptions (dictionary
definitions) were probably less important and auditory sensa-
tions quite irrelevant. No subject had difficulty understanding
the task, which entailed indicating the scores corresponding to
the relevance of each “source” of knowledge on the response
sheets.
Participants
The study was conducted on 100 normal adults (50 males and
50 females) of age ranging between 60 and 84 years of age and
with an educational level ranging from 5 to 13 years of schooling.
These subjects were recruited among the caregivers of patients
attending the Neuropsychology Centre of the Policlinico Gemelli
or in Centers for independent old people of the City of Rome
who fulfilled the following criteria: (a) absence of neurological,
medical, or psychiatric disorders that could influence their cogni-
tive functions; (b) absence of severe visual and auditory disorders;
(c) age and education corrected Mini Mental State Examination
(MMSE) scores within the normal range.
To rule out the influence of response bias or of poor motiva-
tion during the task, we also excluded from analysis (d) subjects
whose scores fell in the upper (from 4 to 7) or in the lower
part (from 0 to 3) of the evaluation scale in more than 80% of
the stimuli; (e) subjects who gave “odd” scores in more than 3
“sentinel items” (i.e., high scores on the “taste” modality for vehi-
cles, on the “auditory” modality for fruits and on the “olfactory”
modality for tools). Five subjects were excluded from analysis for
reason (d) and 3 for reason (e). Therefore, the final number of
participants was 92. Half of the subjects (mean age: 66.55 ± 6.01;
educational level 9.7 ± 2.2; MMSE 28.7 ± 1.9) rated the rele-
vance of each “source of knowledge” with stimuli presented in
the written modality, and the other half (mean age: 66.44 ± 5.82;
educational level 10.3 ± 2.8; MMSE 28.9 ± 1.3) made the same
evaluation with stimuli presented in the pictorial modality. No
significant differences were found for age, educational level and
corrected MMSE scores, between subjects who had rated the rel-
evance of each “source of knowledge,” with stimuli presented in
the written and in the pictorial modality.
RESULTS
OVERALL JUDGMENTS OF FAMILIARITY ACROSS THE BROAD
DOMAINS OF ANIMALS, PLANT LIFE, AND ARTIFACTS
The first step of our analysis consisted of computing themean val-
ues of familiarity across the broad domains of animals, plant life
and artifacts, with and without considering separately the judg-
ments given with verbal and pictorial stimuli. Table 1 summarizes
data considered in this analysis.
Data reported in Table 1 show that our subjects gave a different
familiarity score to the different domains considered in our study;
for example, animals were rated as significantly less familiar than
plant life (p < 0.001) and artifacts (p < 0.001). In order to asses
if judgments of familiarity could have been influenced by the ver-
bal or pictorial nature of the stimuli administered, we carried out
a two way ANOVA considering “Categories” and “Presentation
Modality” as independent variables and scores on the judgment
of familiarity as dependent variable.
The general analysis showed a significant general effect of
the factor “Categories” [F(2, 192), 57.85; p < 0.0001] suggesting
a significant different general weight of the familiarity in
the different categories. A significant general effect was also
observed for the factor “presentation modality” [F(1, 192); 5.16;
p < 0.02] indicating a significant general effect of modality of
presentation (i.e., by name or by picture) on the judgment
of familiarity which resulted higher for the verbal than the
pictorial presentation modality. No interaction was observed,
however, between the two independent variables [F(2, 192):1.06;
p < NS] indicating that the presentation modality did not
affect the judgment of familiarity across the different categories
considered.
Table 1 | Mean familiarity values and Standard Deviations (in brackets) for the domains of plant life, animals and artifacts: general scores and
separate scores for presentation modality.
Plant life (items = 32) Animals (items = 24) Artifacts (items = 42)
Familiarity 5.8 (0.60) 4.3 (1.02) 5.7 (0.89)
Pictorial Verbal Pictorial Verbal Pictorial Verbal
5.77 (0.60) 5.87 (0.61) 4.02 (1.08) 4.58 (0.90) 5.63 (0.99) 5.92 (0.76)
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JUDGMENTS OF RELEVANCE OF THE VARIOUS “SOURCES OF
KNOWLEDGE” ACROSS THE DOMAINS OF ANIMALS, PLANT LIFE, AND
ARTIFACTS, CONSIDERING THE INFLUENCE OF THE VERBAL OR
PICTORIAL NATURE OF THE STIMULI ON THESE EVALUATIONS
Our next step was to assess whether the judgments of relevance
of the various “sources of knowledge” were different across the
broad domains of animals, plant life and artifacts and to consider
the influence of the verbal or pictorial nature of the stimuli on
these evaluations. Table 2 summarizes the data relevant to this
analysis.
In order to assess if the relevance of the various “sources
of knowledge” was different across the different categories of
animals, plant life and artifacts and whether it was influenced
by the verbal or pictorial nature of the stimuli, we carried out
a mixed MANOVA, followed by specific effect single ANOVAs
and by post hoc Tukey test comparisons, in which Presentation
Modality’ were between factor and “Categories” within factor
independent variables and scores of the various sources of knowl-
edge taken into account as dependent variables. As the weight of
the different sources of knowledge in each of the various broad
categories of “Plant Life,” “Artifacts,” and “Animals” (column
analyses) were not normally distributed, in a second analysis we
investigated the differences among sources of knowledge using
the Wilcoxon Matched paired tests, carried out separately for
each broad category and type of presentation. The general anal-
ysis showed a significant effect within factor for “categories”
[Wilks’ lambda(16, 176): 024; p < 0.0001] suggesting that the dif-
ferent sources of knowledge are judged as having a different
weight in the construction of the different categories. A significant
effect was also observed for the factor “presentation modality”
[Wilks’ lambda(8, 88): 52; p < 0.006] indicating that the modality
of presentation (by name or by picture) can influence the scores
assigned by the subjects to the various sources of knowledge.
Specific effect analyses showed that each source of knowledge had
a significantly different weight in all categories with the exception
of Visual “Shape” and Language after verbal presentation, which
did not differ across categories.
When we analyzed the weight of each source of knowledge in
each broad category, we observed that the visual form was con-
sidered as the most informative font for all the broad domains
taken into account, and that the second source was different in
the living categories of animals and plant life and in artifacts,
because in the former the second source consisted of another
visual property (i.e., color) whereas in artifacts it was represented
by the actions performed with (or on) them. The differences
between animals and plant life emerged at a later step, because the
next most relevant sources of information in animals consisted of
auditory perceptions (the typical sounds) and language (encyclo-
pedic knowledge), whereas in plant life they consisted of actions
(e.g., peeling, cutting, and stirring) and by olfactory and gustatory
perceptions.
As for the second factor (modality of presentation), specific
effect analyses showed that its effect was significant (p < 0.002)
only in the “language” source of knowledge, which was higher
by name [3.95 (± 0.25)] than by pictorial [3.72 (± 0.19)] pre-
sentation of the various items. A non-significant trend was also
observed for the visual form (p < 0.07) and color (p < 0.08)
which were higher by name than by pictorial presentation. The
modality of presentation did not affect the scores assigned to the
other sources of knowledge.
Table 2 | Mean values and Standard Deviations (in brackets) of the judgments of relevance of the various “sources of knowledge” in the
domains of plant life, animals, and artifacts.
Plant life (items n:32) Animals (items n:24) Artifacts (items n:42) Picture Verbal
Picture Verbal Picture Verbal Picture Verbal F values F values
Visual “Shape” 5.89 5.60 5.43 5.53 5.76 5.64 8.9 0.49
(0.36) (0.51) (0.47) (0.41) (0.40) (0.38) p < 0.001 p: ns
Visual “Color” 5.61 5.35 4.41 4.48 3.96 3.73 77.8 78.1
(0.44) (0.49) (0.54) (0.47) (0.68) (0.63) p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Auditory 0.33 0.32 2.71 2.69 1.29 1.39 36.0 28.6
(0.21) (0.17) (1.25) (1.31) (1.26) (1.45) p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Olfactive 4.11 4.01 1.84 1.99 0.87 0.82 153.9 135.6
(1.02) (1.02) (0.85) (0.87) (0.50) (0.60) p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Gustatory 3.84 3.84 1.24 1.20 0.27 0.22 36.2 38.9
(2.79) (2.72) (1.72) (1.69) (0.17) (0.14) p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Tactile 3.71 3.53 1.89 1.86 3.05 3.14 21.3 21.3
(0.76) (0.63) (1.13) (1.14) (1.15) (1.10) p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Language 3.64 3.85 3.99 4.04 3.55 3.97 4.7 0.98
(0.49) (0.56) (0.60) (0.49) (0.67) (0.52) p < 0.01 p: ns
Action/motricity 4.25 4.19 1.94 2.13 4.74 5.06 57.8 70.1
(0.95) (0.91) (1.09) (1.12) (1.06) (0.92) p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Scores are analyzed separately by presentation modality.
Note: Columns report the values of the judgments of relevance of the different sources of knowledge across categories: the highest significant values (p < 0.05
after Bonferroni’s correction) are reported in bold, the second highest are underlined and the next (third highest) are reported in italics.
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Finally a non-significant interaction (p < 0.06) was observed
among the two independent variables (categories and presenta-
tion modality) indicating that the presentation modality does not
influence the weights assigned by the subjects to the sources of
knowledge across the different categories considered.
DETAILED EVALUATION OF FAMILIARITY AND OF RELEVANCE OF
VARIOUS “SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE” IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES
As results of the previous section showed that the modality of pre-
sentation has a significant effect only on the weight assigned to the
source of knowledge “language,” we did not analyze separately the
evaluations given with verbal and pictorial stimuli, when we tried
to more analytically consider the judgments of familiarity and the
relevance attributed to various sources of knowledge in the con-
struction of more specific domains within the above mentioned
general categories. Therefore, this evaluation was made by group-
ing together scores obtained for each source of knowledge with
verbal and pictorial stimuli.
Data concerning this analysis are reported in Table 3.
These data were analyzed with a general MANOVA, followed
by specific effect single ANOVAs„ which considered the “cat-
egories” as independent variables and the “familiarity ratings”
and the “sources of knowledge” as dependent variables. This
general analysis was highly significant, (Wilks’ lambda 0.0003
p < 0.0001) suggesting that the familiarity with the various cate-
gories was different and that various sources of knowledge play a
different role in the construction of the categories considered in
our study. Specific comparisons were carried out by means of sin-
gle ANOVAs followed by post hoc Tukey tests for unequal sample
size to analyze the single effects of each source of knowledge in the
various categories (columns analyses). On the other hand, as the
data in the categories were not normally distributed (rows anal-
yses), Friedman’s Matched Pairs Rank Order analyses of variance
(Siegel, 1956) were carried out to compare the different weight of
each source in each category.
The study of subjective familiarity has provided more precise
details about results previously described in Table 2 by showing
that fruits, tools and furniture are generally rated as the most
familiar, whereas wild animals are by far rated as least familiar.
The analysis of the sources of knowledge, on the other hand,
shows that all the sources considered in our study have a very
different influence on the organization of the specific categories
taken into account. Data reported in the different columns of
Table 3 confirm the predominant role attributed by our sub-
jects to the visual modality, particularly to shape, as the main
source of knowledge for almost all the categories considered in
our study. The only exception was “taste,” which was rated as
slightly more important than shape for fruits and vegetables;
however, this difference was not significant. Shape and taste are,
therefore ranked first ex aequo for this category. Color was also
evaluated as very important for all the living categories (fruits,
vegetables, flowers, and wild or domestic animals), whereas all
other “perceptual” modalities were less relevant (or relevant only
Table 3 | Overall mean values of familiarity and judgments of relevance of the various sources of knowledge for specific semantic categories of
animals, plant life, and artifacts.
Familiarity Language Visual shape Visual color Action/motricity Auditory Tactile Olfactive Taste
Fruits 6.27 3.89 5.97** 5.63* 4.98 0.27 4.15 4.14 6.09**
0.33 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.21 0.50 0.95 0.38
Vegetables 5.93 3.46 5.71** 5.49* 4.58 0.33 3.59 3.51 5.75**
0.34 0.48 0.38 0.39 0.66 0.16 0.58 1.09 0.56
Flowers 5.35 3.86 5.59** 5.34** 3.30 0.36 3.21 4.45* 0.38
0.62 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.20 0.65 0.83 0.23
Pets 5.12 4.10* 5.69** 4.49* 2.98 3.38 2.83 2.54 2.24
0.62 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.66 1.14 0.76 0.71 1.91
Wild animal 3.48 3.93* 5.28** 4.41* 1.10 2.02 0.92 1.30 0.21
0.61 0.49 0.41 0.59 0.41 1.01 0.31 0.44 0.08
Tools 6.16 3.58 5.74** 3.32 5.36* 1.01 3.39 0.31 0.27
0.60 0.59 0.31 0.44 0.60 0.62 0.74 0.17 0.20
Furniture 6.17 3.78 5.80** 3.95 5.20* 0.65 3.20 0.80 0.26
0.59 0.50 0.51 0.64 0.74 0.36 0.99 0.47 0.17
Clothes 5.79 3.43 5.57∗∗ 4.32 4.82∗ 0.51 3.78 1.21 0.25
0.72 0.53 0.30 0.54 0.90 0.36 0.93 0.46 0.13
Vehicles 4.92 4.30* 5.71** 3.90 4.10* 3.27 1.98 1.16 0.22
1.02 0.57 0.42 0.58 1.25 1.43 1.04 0.51 0.12
P value p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001 p < 0.0001
Note: Columns report the values of familiarity and of the different sources of knowledge across categories: the significantly (p < 0.05 after Bonferroni’s correction)
highest values obtained in familiarity and in specific sources of knowledge on each category are reported in bold (first values) or italics (second values). The weight
of the various sources within each category are reported in rows. The highest significant values (p < 0.05 after Bonferroni’s correction) obtained in each category on
the various sources of knowledge are marked with asterisks [**first value(s); *second value(s)].
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for specific categories). Thus, (as we have already noticed) taste is
very relevant only for fruits and vegetables, and a very similar pat-
tern is attributed to smell (which was rated high for flowers, fruits
and vegetables and, to a lesser extent, for pets). On the other hand,
the action-related sources of knowledge are considered as only
slightly less relevant than the visual shape in the case of the tool
and furniture categories, and are also very important in the rep-
resentation of other artifacts and fruits and vegetables. This last
finding is probably due to the fact that, just as in the case of arti-
facts, part of our knowledge of fruits and vegetables comes from
actions (such as peeling, cutting, cooking, or eating) made on
them. For the same reason, a pattern of relevance similar to that
of the typical actions is observed when we consider the somato-
sensory data, which are judged as important for the categories of
fruits and vegetables, clothing, tools, and furniture. Apart from
these clusters, a rather similar pattern is presented by language
and auditory information. Language (encyclopedic knowledge)
is considered as important, but not critical, for almost all the
categories but particularly relevant for animals and vehicles.
Similarly, the role of auditory information is judged as important
only for pets and vehicles (probably because both make typical
sounds).
COMPARISONS OF SCORES OBTAINED BY YOUNG AND ELDERLY
SUBJECTS ON THE JUDGMENTS OF RELEVANCE OF THE VARIOUS
SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF DIFFERENT
SEMANTIC CATEGORIES
Table 4 reports the rank order of the judgments of relevance of
the various sources of knowledge in the construction of differ-
ent semantic categories obtained in our previous study on young
adults (Gainotti et al., 2009) and in the present investigation.
It was impossible to make more analytical and statistical
comparisons between the two sets of data, for two main reasons.
First, the sources of knowledge taken into account in the two stud-
ies were not exactly the same. In particular, visual shape and color
were rated separately in the present investigation, whereas in the
previous study they had been pooled together under the head-
ing of “visual sources of knowledge.” Second, in the first study
subjects had been given a sheet with both picture and name of
each stimulus, whereas in this second study pictures and names
were presented separately to different populations. For this rea-
son, in Table 4 we matched only the ranks of the ratings obtained
in each modality by young and elderly patients and for the latter
we made a mean of the ratings obtained after picture and name
presentation for all single items.
The representation (Table 4) of the rank of relevance in young
and elderly people for all the categories and all the sources of
knowledge shows, in any case, that if changes can be found as a
function of age in the importance of various source of knowledge
for the conceptual representation, these changes are really mini-
mal. The visual sources of knowledge were ranked first by both
young and elderly subjects in almost all the semantic categories
considered. Similarly, in both young and in elderly subjects, the
second rank consisted of: (a) action based knowledge in almost all
the artifact categories; and (b) language in both domestic and in
wild animals. Furthermore, in both young and in elderly subjects
the third rank consisted of: (a) the auditory information for wild
animals and (b) the tactile sources of knowledge for almost all
the artifact categories. The only slight difference between elderly
and young subjects was in the “vegetable” category, in which
action-related sources of knowledge were ranked higher (3rd) by
elderly than young (5th) subjects. This slight difference may be
Table 4 | Rank order of the judgments of relevance of the various sources of knowledge for the specific semantic categories of animals, plant
life and artifacts in Young (Y) and Elderly (E) subjects.
Language Visual Action/motricity Auditory Tactile Olfactive Taste
Fruits E 6 1 3 7 4 4 1
Y 6 1 4 7 4 3 1
Vegetables E 6 1 3 7 4 4 1
Y 6 1 5 7 4 3 2
Flowers E 3 1 4 6 4 2 6
Y 3 1 5 6 4 2 7
Pets E 2 1 4 3 4 6 6
Y 2 1 3 3 3 3 7
Wild animal E 2 1 4 3 6 4 7
Y 2 1 4 3 5 5 7
Tools E 3 1 2 5 3 6 6
Y 4 1 2 5 3 6 6
Furniture E 3 1 2 5 4 5 7
Y 4 1 2 5 3 6 6
Clothes E 4 1 2 6 3 5 7
Y 4 1 2 6 3 5 7
Vehicles E 2 1 2 4 5 6 7
Y 3 1 2 3 5 6 7
Note: The numbers represent the rank achieved by each category in the present study and in the previous study on young subjects by Gainotti et al. (2009).
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due to the fact that the knowledge of vegetable is in part based
onmanipulation and action schemata, whose frequent utilization
can increase with age.
CLUSTER ANALYSIS ON DATA OBTAINED IN THE DIFFERENT
CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES CONSIDERED IN OUR STUDY
In order to provide a representation of how our specific categories
of animals, plant life, and artifacts group, in terms of relative
importance of the different sources of knowledge, we conducted
a cluster analysis, considering the distance among the various
categories as an index of their similarity, in terms of weight of
the various sources of knowledge. Furthermore, to maximize the
distance among categories, rather than among sources of knowl-
edge, a rather strict form of “cases tree clustering” (i.e., the “City
Block ‘Manhattan’ Distance”) representing a complete linkage
method, was used for the cluster analysis. The results are shown
in Figure 1.
There are three major clusters in Figure 1, each correspond-
ing basically, but not exactly, to the distinction between plant life,
animals, and artifacts. On the extreme right of the dendrogram
there is a cluster consisting of fruits and vegetables. This cluster is
very close to the left side of a larger cluster, consisting of two sub-
groups, including flowers, pets, vehicles, and wild animals. The
last, most left-sided cluster includes tools, furniture, and clothes.
Thus, fruits and vegetables are located on the right side of the den-
drogram and manipulable objects on the left side. In the center of
the dendrogram is a large and heterogeneous group of categories,
which includes on its right side flowers, then domestic and wild
animals and vehicles. The association between pets and vehicles is
probably due to the relevance that our subjects attributed to lan-
guage and typical sounds, as important sources of knowledge of
both these categories, as is shown by data reported in Table 3.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the present investigation was to more thoroughly
analyze the problem of the relevance of different sources of
knowledge in the construction of various conceptual categories,
by taking into account a number of variables that have never
been considered or have given conflicting results. Our expecta-
tion was that a more thorough knowledge of the relevance of
different sources of knowledge in the construction of various
conceptual categories would help choose among the different the-
ories on the representation of concepts discussed in the section
“Introduction,” and would confirm and extend results obtained
in previous investigations (e.g., Tranel et al., 1997; Vigliocco et al.,
2004; McRae et al., 2005; Gainotti et al., 2009; Carota et al.,
2012; Hoffman and Lambon Ralph, 2013), thus providing further
support for the “sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge,”
(Gainotti, 2000, 2006; Martin and Chao, 2001; Martin, 2007;
Kalénine et al., 2010).
With this aim in mind, we focused on broad semantic cate-
gories and rated stimulus familiarity and the influence of different
sources of knowledge in the representation of animals, plant
life, and artifact categories, rather than in living and non-living
beings, which has been done in many previous studies on this
topic.
The distinction between “animals” and “plant life” in the
“living” categories was confirmed by results of the present inves-
tigation, because, even if visual features (shape and color) were
considered as the most informative sources of knowledge for all
the living categories, an important difference between animals
and plant life emerged at a later step. In fruits and vegeta-
bles the next most relevant sources of information consisted of
olfactory and gustatory perceptions and by actions (e.g., peel-
ing, cutting, and stirring), whereas in animals they consisted of
FIGURE 1 | Cluster analysis of the semantic categories grouped in terms of salience of the different sources of knowledge.
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auditory perceptions (typical sounds) and language (encyclope-
dic knowledge).
A cluster analysis also allowed distinguishing fruits and veg-
etables from animals, because the former made a small distinct
cluster, whereas the latter entered into a larger heterogeneous
cluster, which was intermediate between “fruits and vegetables”
on one side and “artifacts” on the other side. All these data are
consistent with results obtained in previous studies, carried out
with young undergraduate students by Tranel et al. (1997), Cree
and McRae (2003), Vinson et al. (2003), Vigliocco et al. (2004),
Gainotti et al. (2009), and Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (2013).
Also consistent with results of previous investigations and
perfectly in line with the principles of the “sensory-motor
model of semantic knowledge,” were the associations between
sources of knowledge characteristic of living beings and arti-
facts, because, even though visual features were considered as
the most informative sources of knowledge for all the biolog-
ical and artifacts categories, the second most important font
was different for the living categories and for artifacts. In all
the biological categories the second most important source con-
sisted of another perceptual property (that was different for the
specific domains of animals and plant-life), whereas in arti-
facts it was represented by the actions performed with (or on)
them and by the correlative somato-sensory information. An
evidence supporting the claim of a strict connection between
action schemata and the correlative somato-sensory informa-
tion comes from a cluster analysis derived from the sources
of knowledge instead than from the categories and reported in
Figure 2.
In this case, the cluster shows a tight linkage between these two
sources of knowledge. Furthermore, the same cluster analysis con-
firms: (a) that visual data stand apart from all the other sources of
knowledge; (b) that a significant linkage exists between taste and
smell (in fruits and vegetables) and between auditory data and
language (in animals and vehicles).
The patterns of associations between visual and other per-
ceptual information in living beings and between visual and
action related information in tools and other artifacts have been
reported in previous studies by Tranel et al. (1997), Vigliocco
et al. (2004), Gainotti et al. (2009), and by Hoffman and Lambon
Ralph (2013). These associations between visual and other per-
ceptual modalities in the case of biological entities and between
visual and action related information in the case of artifacts are
consistent with the neuroanatomical models of these categories,
drawn from the “sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge,”
(Gainotti et al., 2009; Gainotti, 2010; Kalénine et al., 2010). These
models, indeed, suggest that biological entities should be repre-
sented at the convergence between the ventral stream of visual
processing and other perceptual inputs, whereas tools and other
artifacts should be represented at the convergence between the
dorsal stream of visual processing and the motor and somatosen-
sory cortices. Surely, the anterior parts of the temporal lobes
(where the ventral stream converges with auditory, olfactory and
gustatory inputs), should play a critical role in the representa-
tion of biological entities (Gainotti, 2000, 2005, 2010), whereas
the left frontoparietal, sensorimotor cortices (where the dorsal
stream converges with body-related and action oriented struc-
tures), should play a major role in the representation of artifacts
(Gainotti, 2000; Kellenbach et al., 2003; Martin, 2007; Kalénine
et al., 2010). A second less important aim of our study was to eval-
uate the influence of the verbal or pictorial nature of the stimuli
on the judgment of relevance of various perceptual, motor, and
language-mediated “sources of knowledge” in the construction
of different conceptual categories. We included this because in
a previous study on this topic (Gainotti et al., 2009), each item
had been represented with both a picture and a written word
FIGURE 2 | Cluster analysis carried out to explore how the sources of knowledge group together in terms of their specific weight in characterizing
the items of all the categories considered in the study.
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printed in big capital letters. This was criticized by Hoffman and
Lambon Ralph (2013), who argued that a pictorial form could
bias subjects toward giving higher ratings for visual sources of
knowledge. Our results do not confirm this claim, because they
have shown that the verbal or pictorial modality of presentation
affects the familiarity feelings more than the judgment of rele-
vance of the sources of knowledge. Stimuli were, indeed, judged
as more familiar when they were presented in the verbal than
in the pictorial modality, whereas the modality of presentation
exerted a significant effect only on the weight assigned to the
source of knowledge “language,” which was higher when the
stimulus was presented by name than by picture. On the con-
trary, neither the verbal nor the pictorial modality of presentation
affected the scores assigned to the other sources of knowledge
and no interaction was observed between categories and presen-
tation modality, indicating that the verbal or pictorial nature of
the stimuli did not influence the weights assigned by the subjects
to the sources of knowledge across the broad domains taken into
account.
A third variable considered in our study was the influence of
age (and of experience related factors), because we intended to
check if results obtained in previous studies by young undergrad-
uate students could be generalized to older adults, who were uns-
elected as to their educational level and working activities. Our
results showed that this generalization is possible, because only
small differences were found between the judgments made by
young undergraduate students and elderly subjects regarding the
relevance of different sources of knowledge in the construction
of various conceptual categories. Our elderly subjects showed,
indeed, a systematic tendency to consider the visual modality
as the main source of knowledge for all categories of animals,
plant-life and artifacts and estimated that, after the visual infor-
mation the second most important source is different for the
living categories and artifacts. In the living categories the second
most important source of knowledge was a perceptual property
whereas in the case of artifacts it was represented by the actions
performed with (or on) them. All these findings are consistent
with data obtained with different methodologies in young under-
graduate students by Tranel et al. (1997), Vigliocco et al. (2004),
Gainotti et al. (2009), and Hoffman and Lambon Ralph (2013),
confirming that data obtained in a sample of young students
can be generalized to older subjects, unselected with respect to
their educational level and working activities. The only differ-
ences between results of our previous study and of the present
investigation that could suggest a (very mild) influence of age-
related experience on the sources of knowledge underlying the
different semantic categories concerned: (a) the greater relevance
of the action-related sources of knowledge in elderly than in
young subjects for the vegetables category; (b) the tighter asso-
ciation between animals and vehicles found in our dendrogram
in comparison with that obtained in the study conducted on
young subjects. We had, indeed, hypothesized in the introduction:
(a) that for some categories of artifacts or fruits and vegetable,
whose knowledge in partly based upon manipulation and action
schemata (Gainotti, 2010) the relevance of action-related sources
of knowledge could increase with age; (b) that the categories
of animals and vehicles could be more closely linked in elderly
patients, who in their young age had perhaps used some animals
(e.g., horses or donkeys) as a mean of transport than in young
students, who had never proved this kind of experience. The first
point has been (at least in part) confirmed by our data, whereas
the relevance of the second point remains problematic, because
an association between animals and vehicles has recently been
reported also in young people by Hoffman and Lambon Ralph
(2013), who have noticed that the knowledge of both vehicles
and animals is based on typical sounds and motion information.
Furthermore, although many studies have treated artifacts as a
single category, there are some cases of patients with non-living
deficits who showed relatively preserved knowledge of vehicles.
For instance, patient YOT (Warrington and McCarthy, 1987)
showed poor comprehension of manipulable objects but more
intact knowledge of large artifacts, many of which were vehicles,
and similar results were observed in patients KE (Hillis et al.,
1990) and GP (Cappa et al., 1998). It seems, therefore, safe to
conclude that age-related factors, based on changes in the exter-
nal milieu or on personal experiences have a very limited impact
on judgments concerning the relevance of different sources of
knowledge in the construction of various conceptual categories.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, results of the present research confirm: (a) that a
distinction can be made between “animals” “plant life” and arti-
facts on the basis of their prevalent sources of knowledge; (b) that
this distinction is not based on the prevalence of visual infor-
mation in living beings and of functional information in artifact
categories, but rather on the convergence of visual with other per-
ceptual data in the biological categories and of visual with action
and somatosensory data, in the representation of tools and other
artifact categories; (c) that age and stimulus modality have a very
limited influence on the weights assigned by normal subjects to
the sources of knowledge underlying various kinds of biological
and artifact categories. All these data confirm and extend results
obtained in previous investigations, and provide further support
for the “sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge.”
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